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Comment
JUDGMENTS AGAINST JOINT TORT-FEASORS-PROBLEMS
ARISING ON APPEAL BY ONLY ONE DEFENDANT
I. IN rODUcTiON
A judgment rendered against joint tort-feasors is an entirety, and the
amount of damages assessed against them in a single action must be in a single
amount.1 When one joint tort-feasor appeals from a judgment against him, but
his co-defendant does not appeal, the unity of the single judgment is challenged.
Any change in the judgment against the defendant who appeals may result in
different damage verdicts against the joint tort-feasors.
In this comment a defendant who perfects an appeal will be called the
"aqtive defendant." A defendant who does not appeal, who does not respond to an
appeal by plaintiff, or who fails to perfect an appeal which he has begun will be
referred to as an "inert defendant."
There are only four general types of cases in which the inert defendant
creates a problem:
1. In the first type of case plaintiff is successful against only one defendant.
The unsuccessful defendant appeals, and plaintiff appeals from the judgment in
favor of the successful defendant, who does not respond. The first situation is
typified by Roark v. Gunter.2
2. The second type of case is slightly different. Here plaintiff appeals from a
judgment in favor of the active defendant. The other defendant was 'unsuccessful
below, and he remains inert. An example of this type of case is Gardzer v. Sim-.
ln.o;S. 8
3. A third situation arises when both defendants are successful in the trial
court, -but only one of them responds to an appeal by plaintiff. Examples of this
situation are rare. However, an appeal which results in affirmance has the same
final result as no appeal at all, with respect to the form of the original judgment.
Thus the third situation is analogous to a case in which both defendants respond,
but only one of them is successful on appeal. The problem on appeal is much the
same as it would be if the unsuccessful defendant had remained inert. Cox v.
WrinklW4 is such a case.
1. Roark v. Gunter, 391 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Mo. 1965); Gardner v. Simmons,
370 S.W.2d 359, 366 (Mo. 1963); Cox v. Wrinkle, 267 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Mo. 1954);
Snyder v. Hedges, 381 S.W.2d 376, 382 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Davison v. Farr,
273 S.W.2d 500, 505 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954).
2. S pra note 1.
3. Supra note 1.
4. Supra note 1.
(141)
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4. The most common of the four types is the case in which both defendants
are unsuccessful in the trial court, but only one defendant perfects an appeal.5
II. DisPOSrION ON AiPEAL
A. The Common Law Rule
On an appeal by only one defendant, the practice at common law was to re-
verse the judgment and order a new trial for all issues. 6 Both the active and
inert defendants were included in the new trial order. There were two reasons for
this sort of disposition:
1. On a venire facias de novo no notice was taken of the record of the first
trial of the action. If a new trial was granted to one defendant, there would be
nothing left in the record to sustain a judgment against the inert defendant. Only
by including the inert defendant in the order could he be kept in the record on a
venire facias de novo.7
2. At common law the judgment was regarded as an entirety in a very strict
sense. It could not be split into issues of liability and damages, nor could it be split
between parties. When final judgment was rendered it had to be in the same
amount against all the parties found liable.
Under the common law rule the inert defendant could have a new trial of the
action if an active defendant was successful on an appeal. If -plaintiff's judgment
against the active defendant was reversed, plaintiff also lost his judgment against
defendants against whom no error had been committed or who had not perfected
an appeal.8
B. The Modern Rule
The common law rule has been largely abandoned. Since the liability of joint
tort-feasors is both joint and several,9 plaintiff initially has a choice of bringing
suit against any or all possible defendants. Plaintiff can dismiss the action against
any defendant and, after judgment has been rendered, has the choice of enforcing
the judgment against any or all of the defendants found liable. Plaintiff may even
sue the joint tort-feasors separately, although he is entitled to but one satisfaction.10
In an action against two joint tort-feasors error in the judgment against one de-
fendant should not deprive plaintiff of a judgment against a co-defendant who
could have been sued alone. Since the inert defendant could have been sued
separately, there is no reason to give him the benefit of his co-defendant's appeal.11
The modem cases allow a plaintiff to hold the parts of his judgment which
5. Yarrington v. Lininger, 327 S.W.2d 104 (Mo. 1959); Rosenkoetter v. Fleer,
155 S.W.2d 157 (Mo. 1941); Snyder v. Hedges, supra note 1; Bauman v. Conrad,
342 S.W.2d 284 (St. L. Mo. App. 1961); Davison v. Farr, supra note 1.
6. Annot., 143 A.L.R. 7 (1943).
7. Id. at 8; 39 AM. JUR. New Trial § 25 (1942).
8. Supra note 6, at 9; 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appeal and Error § 949 (1962).
9. 52 Am. JUR. Torts §§ 110, 119 (1944).
10. 52 Am. JuR. Torts §§ 127, 128 (1944). See, Payne v. Bertman, 224 Mo.
App. 402, 27 S.W.2d 28 (K.C. Ct. App. 1930).
11. See 5 AM. Jur. 2D Appeal and Error § 951 (1962).
[Vol. 31
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 1 [1966], Art. 17
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol31/iss1/17
COMMENT
are neither attacked nor erroneous. In most cases there is no distinction between
an inert defendant and an active defendant against whom no error was com-
mitted.12 Insofar as the disposition on appeal is concerned there is little justification
for distinguishing the reasons for defendant's failure on appeal. He is bound by
the original judgment whether it is affirmed because not erroneous or whether it
remains effective because not attacked.
The modern cases do recognize some circumstances which can deprive a
plaintiff of part of his judgment against an inert defendant. Although there is no
set rule for every case, some of these circumstances are definite enough to be
classified. In one class of cases it is evident that the mere presence of one of the
defendants in the lawsuit had an influence on the verdict.
When the wealth or the insurance of one defendant is made known to the
jury, there is a strong possibility that the jury may consider that particular de-
fendant's ability to pay in arriving at a damage verdict. The presumption that a
jury followed the damage instructions is not based on fact in such a case. "[lt
cannot be assumed that they attempted to make the 'punishment fit the crime,'
rather than the offenders . . ... '3 If one defendant is a large and well-known
corporation, the jury cannot be presumed to be ignorant of its ability to pay. In
their deliberations over the amount of damages they might well be expected to
decide on a higher figure than if an individual co-defendant had been sued alone.
If the affluent defendant appeals and is granted a new trial, his success on the new
trial may well leave the inert defendant liable for a larger verdict than would
have resulted from a separate trial.' 4 In such a case the better practice would
be to reverse the damage judgment and order a trial de novo to all parties on that
issue.
Other instances of influence by presence are not unusual. When punitive dam-
ages are in issue, the success of the active defendant in obtaining a new trial may
require a new trial on the damage question for the inert defendant.' 5 One de-
fendant may affect the verdict by making only a pretense of defending the case.16
Inflammatory remarks made about the active defendant during the trial may in-
fluence the jury in assessing the money liability of both defendants. If such re-
marks are likely to have so influenced the jury, a new trial on damages should be
granted to both defendants.17
In another class of cases the interdependence of the joint tortfeasors qualifies
the modem rule. If the joint tort-feasors are master and servant, their interde-
pendence may necessitate a complete trial de novo to avoid an incongruous final
12. Annot., 143 A.L.R. 7, 50 (1943).
13. Schloss v. Silverman, 172 Md. 632, 644, 192 At. 343, 348 (1937).
14. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Landsden, 172 U.S. 534 (1899), is a leading
case on this point. See, e.g., Harrington v. H. D. 'Lee Mercantile Co., 97 Mont.
40, 33 P.2d 553 (1934), and cases in Annot., 143 A.L.R. 7, 31 (1943) and Annot.,
34 A.L.R.2d 989, 994 (1954).
15. Landseidel v. Culeman, 47 N.D. 275, 181 N.W. 593 (1921); Schloss v.
Silverman, supra note 13.
16. Szpyrka v. International R.R., 213 App. Div. 390, 210 N.Y. Supp. 553
(1925).
17. Collins v. Hastings, 283 Ill. App. 304 (1936).
1966]
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judgment 18 For example, the master may be granted a new trial because of error
in the issue of the inert defendant's negligence. If the inert servant-defendant is
not also granted a new trial, he may be found to have committed no tort (if the
active master-defendant is successful on the new trial) and yet be liable in tort
in the same action.'9 If the primary issue in both trials is the negligence of the
inert defendant, a final judgment against the inert defendant and for the active
defendant is inconsistent, being based on finding one defendant to be both negli-
gent and not negligent in the same cause of action. If the new trial includes the
question of scope of employment, a general verdict may mask any incongruity of
the final judgment. Judgment for the master in this case would not require a find-
ing that the servant was not negligent.
If the servant is the active defendant, reversing and remanding the cause for
him alone leaves the way open to several problems. If the servant is successful on
his new trial, the master would remain liable on the principle of respondeat s.-
perior as a result of the first trial. But, as a result of the second trial, the servant
would not be liable. A judgment for the servant and against the master in the
same action is clearly illogical. The illogical result would raise a further question
of whether the master can be indemnified by the servant for the loss caused by
the servants negligence, when the judgment is based on finding the servant to be
both negligent and not negligent in the same cause of action. The problems can be
avoided by ordering a new trial for both defendants.20
The modem rule may also be limited by interdependence of the defendants be-
cause of rights to indemnity or contribution. If the active defendant would be
bound to indemnify the inert defendant, both defendants should be granted a new
trial to avoid the possibility of an inconsistent judgment.2 ' Rights of indemnity or
contribution make it necessary that the final judgment against both defendants
be in a single amount.22 If the active defendant is granted a new trial on the
damage issue, the inert defendant should be granted a new trial on this issue.
Error throughout the case may make it necessary to reyerse the entire judg-
ment and grant a new trial for all parties. It has been -held that an error which
affects the entire case may necessitate a reversal for an inert defendant who was
successful in the first trial 23 However, it has also been held that the inert de-
fendant is entitled to hold a verdict in his favor, if the plaintiff does not appeal
from the judgment for that defendant, even though error running through the
18. See 5 AM. JuR. 2D Appeal and Error § 950 (1962).
19. The end result would be a judgment for plaintiff against the servant based
on a jury finding that the servant was negligent, and a judgment for the master
based on a finding that the servant was not negligent in the.same action.
20. See Bishop v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 46, 209 Pac. 1012 (1922). But
see Angell v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 98 Kan. 268, 157 Pac. 1196 (1916).
21. The altdrnative permits the possibiitly of an indemnity action in which
both parties would be able to plead the same judgment as res judicata against
the other.
22. E.g., Miller v. United R.R., 155 Mo. App. 528, 134 S.W. 1045 (St. L. Ct.
App. 1911); Mulderig v. St. Louis K. C. & C. R.R., 116 Mo. App. 655, 94!
S.W. 801 (St. L. Ct. App. 1906). There is a right of contribution among joint tort-
feasors 'held liable under the same judgment. See § 537.060, RSMo 1959.
23. McGovern v. Oliver, 177 App. Div. 167, 163 N.Y. Supp. 275 (1917).
[Vol. 31
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entire case requires reversal for the active defendant. 24 Reversal of a judgment in
favor of the inert defendant when the plaintiff has not appealed is an extreme
remedy, and cases in this area are rare.
One other situation may involve reversal and a new trial for the inert defendant.
Occasionally cases arise in which the active defendant raises questions on appeal
which were not fully developed in the first trial. If the appellate court orders a
new trial to develop such issues more clearly, a new trial for the inert defendant
may be required. Questions of agency and scope of employment should include
both the principal and the agent in a new trial, regardless of the failure of one of
them to appeal. Questions of excessive damage verdicts may be made clearer by a
new trial. In Neal v. Curtis & Co. Mfg. Co.25 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the damage issue for both defendants to clarify the excessive ver-
dict question. Since one factor in the damage verdict was the alleged permanence
of injury, a new trial some time after the first trial would develop the evidence
on this point much better than it could have been developed in the first trial.
C. Missouri Cases
The Missouri courts have used the modem rule, but have not followed the
same procedure used by most courts adopting this rule. In most other jurisdictions
cases involving an inert defendant are handled by reversal for the active defendant
and affirmance for the inert defendant. The Missouri practice is somewhat unusual
in that those parts of the judgment which are not reversed are held in abeyance
pending the new trial on the other issues. 26 Hoelzel v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry.2 7
is a leading case on this practice.
If ... the verdict of liability was permitted to stand against one defendant
because it was free from error, by the same token, if the verdict as to the
amount of damages was free from error, it likewise should have been
permitted to stand against that defendant. Two judgments in the same
case could have been prevented by reversing the judgment and remand-
ing the cause with directions to hold in abeyance the verdict as to both
liability and amount of damages as to the defendant against which no er-
ror was committed, until the cause was finally disposed of as to the liabil-
ity of the other defendant, then enter judgment for the amount of the
verdict held in abeyance against all defendants finally held liable.2 8
This practice enables plaintiff to hold his judgment while insuring that the final
judgment will be in a single amount.
Hoelzel acknowledged that no set rule could .be laid down for every case. The
court used four criteria to determine whether a particular issue may be separated
to become the subject of a new trial:
1. Error in the first trial of the case does not affect the defendants jointly.
24. Brady v. Black & White Cab. Co., 357 S.W.2d 720 (K.C. Mo. App. 1962).
25. 328 Mo. 389, 41 S.W.2d 543 (1931).
26. See Annot., 143 A.L.R. 7, 50 (1943).
27. 337 Mo. 61, 85 S.W.2d 126 (1935). In Hoelzel all defendants appealed, but
there was no error committed against two of them. The disposition would have
been the same if they had not appealed.
28. Id. at 77, 134.
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2. The error was not calculated to affect the parties jointly. In other words,
error as to one defendant was not intended to affect the other joint tort-feasors
present in the same trial.
3. The error does not affect other issues in the trial. For example, Hocizel held
that error in the verdict-directing instruction for one defendant's liability did not
affect the damage issue.
4. It is presumed that the jury followed the instructions which were given.29
The last principle mentioned may conflict with some of the other principles. It
is difficult to assume that the jury followed instructions strictly and disregarded
error which was calculated to affect both defendants. Although knowledge of the
wealth or insurance of one defendant may not affect the other defendant directly,
such knowledge may affect the amount of the damage verdict returned, against
both defendants, regardless of the instructions. By mechanically separating the
defendants from each other and from any error committed against one of them,
the presumption can be justified. If the presumption that the jury followed in-
structions is disregarded, the effect would be equivalent to abandoning the mod-
em rule in many cases. The cases in which the mere presence of one defendant
in the trial is held to have influenced the verdict are all based on the assumption
that the jury did not follow instructions."0 If the presumption is abandoned en-
tirely, all cases of this type should be reversed for both the active defendant and
the inert defendant.
The Missouri cases before and after Hoelzel have used the presumption, ex-
plicitly or implicitly, that the jury followed instructions. No Missouri cases have
been found in which a new trial was granted the inert defendant because the jury
might have deviated from instructions and considered the individual defendants
in arriving at a damage verdict.
The cases vary on the question of ordering a new trial on damages for the
inert defendant. Under the reasoning of Hoeizel, error in the damage issue should
result in a trial de novo of that issue for all defendants. If there is no error in
the damage issue, or if the question is not raised on appeal, Hoelzel indicates that
the damage judgment should be held in abeyance pending a new trial of those
issues in which error was involved.8 1 In the absence of special circumstances the
same result should follow under section 512.160, RSMo 1959.82 However, some
Missouri cases have ordered a new trial on damages for all defendants in the ab-
sence of a finding of error. The reason given for granting a new trial on damages is
preservation of the entirety of the judgment s3 When the active defendant or
29. Id. at 76-77, 134.
30. See discussion II B. infra.
31. Supra note 28.
32. "Unless justice requires otherwise the court shall dispose of the case on
appeal and no new trial shall be ordered as to issues in which no error appears."'
§ 512.160, RSMo 1959.
33. Compare, e.g., Rosenkoetter v. Fleer, supra note 5, and Yarrington v.
Lininger, supra note 1, with Gardner v. Simmons, supra note 1, Davison v. Farr,
s-apra note 1, and Cox v. Wrinkle, supra. note 1. In all of the above cases a new
trial on damages was ordered for all defendants, although there was no specific
finding of error in the damage issue. In the Davison and Gardner cases there was
[Vol. 31
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plaintiff contests the amount of the damage verdict, it might be possible to justify
a new trial by the reasoning in Neal v. Cutrtis & Co. Mfg. Co.3 4 In Neal a new
trial was ordered so the damage issue might be decided with the benefit of any
new evidence on permanent injuries which would have come to light since the
first trial. But the Supreme Court in Hoelzel disapproved of Ne4 on this very
point.3 5 The argument that a new trial on damages would put into the record
additional evidence of the insufficiency or excessiveness of the verdict has had
little support in Missouri since Hoelzel was decided in 1935. If there are other
reasons for granting a new trial on damages to both defendants, the reasons are not
discussed in the cases. 36
Hoelzel and section 512.160, RSMo 1959 indicate that a new trial should not
be granted on issues in which there was no error in the original trial. It might be
expected that when there is no damage issue raised on appeal, that issue will be
handled by holding the damage judgment in abeyance until final disposition of the
case. Roark v. Gunter and other cases have been disposed of in this manner.37 In
Roark v. Gunter, plaintiff and the active defendant failed to raise the damage is-
sue until oral argument before the Missouri Supreme Court. Plaintiff's judgment
in the first trial was for less than the jurisdictional amount. The supreme court
transferred the case to the Kansas City Court of Appeals, stating that the amount
of damages would be held in abeyance pending whatever disposition was finally
made.3s
However, at least one Missouri case has resulted in a new trial on damages for
all parties when the damage issue was apparently not raised on appeal.39 This
would indicate that in the twenty years since Hoelzel the common law rule has
not completely disappeared.
III. SATisFAcrIoN OF THE JUDGMENT BY THE INERT DEFENDANT
After judgment is rendered in the first trial of the action the inert defendant
can create two rather unusual problems. The inert defendant can satisfy the
judgment voluntarily, in which case the active defendant's appeal may be in
danger of dismissal as a moot question. If the inert defendant does not satisfy the
judgment voluntarily, plaintiff may sue out execution against him while the active
defendant's appeal is pending. The inert defendant may hope that his co-de-
fendant's appeal will result in a new trial for him on some issue. He may thus
wish to stay the execution.
an agency question which might have justified the new trial order. In Davison and
Cox there was error running throughout the trial which might have justified a new
trial order. However, neither question was discussed by the court as a reason for
making the order.
34. Supra note 25.
35. Hoelzel v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., supra note 27.
36. Supra note 33.
37. Roark v. Gunter, supra note 1; Lambert v. Jones, 339 Mo. 677, 98 S.W.2d
752 (1936); McCombs v. Ellsberry, 337 Mo. 491, 85 S.W.2d 135 (1935).
38. Roark v. Gunter, supra note 1.
39. Snyder v. Hedges, supra note 1. See Polkowski v. St. Louis Public Serv.
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A. Voluntary Satisfaction
Cases of voluntary satisfaction by an inert defendant are somewhat less than
abundant. The inert defendant will not often wish to pay voluntarily. If -he failed
to appeal for financial reasons, he may be unable to make a voluntary satisfaction.
He may have good reason to believe that plaintiff intends to enforce the judgment
only against the active defendant who, in most cases, is the wealthier of the two.
If the inert defendant should satisfy the judgment, the active defendant may vol-
untarily dismiss his appeal. In any of these cases the appellate court would never
face the question of the effect of the inert defendant's payment on an appeal by
the other parties.
1. The Active Defendant's Problem
If the active defendant continues to press his appeal after the inert defendant
has satisfied the judgment, one line of reasoning indicates the appeal should be
dismissed as presenting only moot questions.40 The original cause of action in-
volved plaintiff and both defendants. Plaintiff is entitled to only one recovery
from either or both of them. Once plaintiff's judgment is satisfied, there is no more
cause of action involving the active defendant and plaintiff. Any questions raised
by the active defendant are moot. If a new trial is granted to the active de-
fendant, other problems would arise. Plaintiff now has his money and has no in-
centive to litigate the cause again against the active defendant. If the inert de-
fendant has not raised a question of indemnity or contribution, the active de-
fendant would be the only party really interested in a new trial. In such a case
the new trial would be little more than a waste of the trial court's time.
It appears that the Kansas courts would dismiss the appeal on the basis of
acquiescence.41 Anything that smacks of acquiescence in the satisfaction would be
grounds for dismissal, since the court is not disposed to answer questions which
have become abstract.
In some cases, however, courts have refused to dismiss an appeal by the active
defendant even though the judgment has been satisfied. The inert defendant should
not be able to deprive the active defendant of his right to appeal, especially where
rights of contribution42 or indemnity45 are involved. If the active defendant may
be liable to the inert defendant for all or part of the amount paid by the inert
defendant, the inert defendant should not be able to cut off his right to appeal.
40. Employers' Fin. Co. v. Lathram, 369 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1963). See, e.g.,
Annot., 39 A.L.R.2d 153, 157 at nn. 18, 19 (1955); Keener v. King Hardware Co.,
215 Ga. 577, 111 S.E.2d 215 (1959); Voorhies Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. Town of
Bunkie, 136 So.2d 141 (La. App. 1961).
41. See Carr v. Diamond, 192 Kan. 336, 388 P.2d 589 (1964), continued at
192 Kan. 377, 388 P.2d 591 (1964); Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1, 150 P.2d
754 (1944); Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523, 1 P.2d 259 (1931); Foster v.
Capital Gas & Elec. Co., 126 Kan. 440, 268 Pac. 738 (1928).
42. See Mon Wai v. Parks, 43 Wash.2d 562, 262 P.2d 196 (1953).
43. See Lesmark, Inc. v. Pryce, 334 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Appeal by
indemnitor-defendant dismissed after satisfaction by inert indemnitee-defendant.
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Even though plaintiff may have no financial interest in a new trial, the issue of
contribution or indemnity between the defendants presents a real controversy.
The active defendant can also be allowed to continue his appeal on the theory
that an erroneous judgment is an injury per se.44 Even when the active defendant
could secure no relief other than reversal of the -record judgment against him, he
may be permitted to continue his appeal. The judgment remains as a matter of
public record. It will have res judicata and collateral estoppel effect in other pro-
ceedings involving the same parties. Even in the absence of financial injury, the
erroneous tort judgment may be an injury to reputation. While the injury to
reputation is not always so serious as injury resulting from an erroneous criminal
conviction, the active defendant has been found "guilty," in some sense, of caus-
ing plaintiff's injury. If the judgment is erroneous, and was satisfied by the inert
defendant without the consent of the active defendant, the satisfaction should not
deprive the active defendant of his right to appeal 5 In addition to injury to
reputation, the judgment may affect the active defendant's position before ad-
ministrative agencies. For example, a fraud judgment can adversely affect the ac-
tive defendant in an administrative proceeding involving his realtor's license. In
this situation the appeal should not be dismissed 48
2. The Inert Defendant's Problem
The inert defendant who wants to pay his share of the damages and have
nothing more to do with the case is faced with a problem. Plaintiff may wish to
avoid accepting any sort of satisfaction from him before disposition of the active
defendant's appeal. If he accepts payment from the inert defendant, he is inviting
the active defendant to move to dismiss any appeal by plaintiff on the ground
that the judgment has been satisfied. In the event that a trial de novo on damages
is ordered for all parties, there is a possibility of additional litigation if plaintiff
recovers a lesser amount in the second trial than he has already collected from the
inert defendant.
The problem of partial satisfaction of a judgment by the inert defendant is
not insuperable. In Markwell v. Local 978, Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners47 an
agreement of partial satisfaction of the judgment was filed by one of three de-
fendants. The terms of the agreement evidenced an intent to settle and adjust the
judgment only as it affected the particular defendant involved. The court held
that the agreement constituted a partial satisfaction and not a release or dis-
charge. Plaintiff's appeal was not dismissed. Since plaintiff would have the oppor-
tunity to enforce the judgment against all of the joint tort-feasors, he would have
the option of enforcing part of his judgment against each of them. There is no
44. See, e.g., Brown v. Detroit Trust Co., 193 F. 626 (6th Cir. 1912); Warner
Bros. Co. v. Freud, 131 Cal. 639, 63 Pac. 1017 (1901); Hartke v. Abbott, 106 Cal.
App. 388, 289 Pac. 206 (1930); Beacon Home Equip. Co. v. Paulsen, 343
Ill. App. 468, 99 N.E.2d 586 (1951).
45. Supra note 44.
46. Metcalf v. Drew, 75 Cal. App.2d 711, 171 P.2d 488 (1946).
47. 215 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mo. 1963). The agreement is set out at page
800 in the report.
1966]
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inherent reason why a plaintiff should not be able to arrange a partial satisfaction
with an inert defendant without jeopardizing his appeal against other defendants.
B. Execution Against t e Inert Defendant
Cases involving execution against an inert defendant are very rare. There are
almost no reported cases on the question whether an inert defendant may be
granted a stay of execution because the active defendant's appeal is pending.
On a theoretical level it would seem that very few cases would arise in which
the question would reach an appellate court. The inert defendant can appeal only
if he is an "aggrieved party" under statutes such as section 512.020, RSMo
1959.48 Since the inert defendant failed to perfect an appeal from the original
tort judgment within the statutory period, he is not aggrieved by the sole fact of
execution against him under that judgment. If the active defendant is unsuccessful
on appeal, the original judgment against both defendants will remain in effect.
Any question of the propriety of execution while the appeal is pending will be-
come moot on affirmance of the judgment.
If the active defendant is successful on appeal and secures an outright re-
versal, the inert defendant is bound by the first judgment as he was before the
appeal was taken. Any questions raised by execution against him before the
reversal are moot, since the inert defendant remains liable for the full amount of
the judgment whether or not his co-defendant is also liable.
If the appellate court orders that damages remain fixed pending a new trial
of the active defendant's liability, the same result will follow with one variation.
While the damage verdict is held in abeyance pending a new trial of another is-
sue, the proceedings under the judgment rendered after the first trial should be
stopped until final disposition of the case when judgment will be entered against
all parties finally held liable.49 The proceedings are stopped because of the order
to hold the judgment in abeyance. The new trial for the active defendant should
not be a sufficient reason for a stay of execution against the inert defendant.
There may be no execution against the inert defendant for practical reasons.
The active defendant is more often in a better position to satisfy the judgment
and, for both financial and personal reasons, plaintiff may prefer to enforce the
judgment against him. If the active defendant does not post an appeal bond plain-
tiff may levy against him. If he does furnish bond, plaintiff has reasonable assur-
ance that the judgment will eventually be satisfied if it is valid.5 0 If the inert de-
fendant is insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof, plaintiff would almost certainly
look to the active defendant alone for satisfaction.
48. "Any party to a suit aggrieved by any judgment of any trial court in
any civil cause . . . may take his appeal to a court having appellate jurisdiction
... from any final judgment in the case. . . ." § 512.020, RSMo 1959. See Robson
v. Superior Court, 171 Cal. 588, 154 Pac. 8 (1915). The inert defendant is not an
"aggrieved party."
49. Hoelzel v. Chicago R.I. & P. Ry., supra notes 27, 28.
50. "1. Appeals shall stay'the execution in the following cases: .. . (2) When
the appellant, at or prior to the time of filing notice of appeal presents to the
court for its approval a supersedeas bond . . . . such appeal bond, approved by
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A final practical consideration is that many joint tort-feasors here treated as
inert have not been completely inactive. In many cases the inert defendant has
filed notice of appeal and has furnished bond, but has failed to perfect his appeal
for some other reason. In such cases the bond is effective to stay the execution
initially. When the appeal fails because the inert defendant failed to perfect it,
the question of satisfaction of the judgment will then involve the terms and con-
ditions of the appeal bond.5' The particular question of execution against the
inert defendant would probably become moot on the disposition of the active de-
fendant's appeal before it would be raised on a motion to stay the execution.
The only area in the inert defendant cases which could present a question
to an appellate court is that where a new trial on damages is ordered for both
defendants. It would be possible for plaintiff to recover, by execution under the
first judgment, an amount greater than the amount of the new trial damage ver-
dict. If this should happen the inert defendant is clearly entitled to restitution of
the excess, 52 but he will not be able to recover for damages caused by execution
under the erroneous first judgment.53 A stay of execution while the appeal is pend-
ing would protect the inert defendant from such damage. In such a case the ques-
tion whether a stay should have been granted because the appeal was pending
would not become moot.
The argument for a stay of execution against the inert defendant hangs by a
slender thread of possibilities:
1. If the appeal is not dismissed either voluntarily or as moot (because the
judgment is satisfied by execution against the inert defendant); and
2. if the active defendant is successful on appeal; and
3. if a new trial on damages is ordered for all defendants; and
4. if the inert defendant's property is sold before the new trial order and the
order to hold the judgment in abeyance; and
5. if the amount recovered by plaintiff under the first judgment is in excess
of the damage judgment rendered on the new trial; and
6. if the inert defendant sustains damages for which he would not be en-
titled to restitution as a result of the levy; then the inert defendant should be
granted a stay of execution pending the appeal by the active defendant. The oc-
currence of all these events in a single case is very unlikely.
the court or clerk ... shall have the effect to stay the execution thereafter. If any
execution shall have been taken prior to the time of filing of the bond as so ap-
proved by the court or clerk, the same shall be released.
"2. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment in full
... if for any reason the appeal is dismissed or if the judgment is affirmed ... 
§ 512.080, RSMo 1959.
51. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sussman, 253 S.W. 186 (St. L. Mo. App. 1923);
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lucky Budge Mining Co., 192 Mo. App. 337, 180 S.W. 1011
(Spr. Ct. App. 1915); Arkansas Valley Trust Co. v. Corbin, 192 Mo. App. 153,
179 S.W. 484 (K.C. Ct. App. 1915).
52. DeMayo v. Lyons, 360 Mo. 512, 228 S.W.2d 691 (1950).
53. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 905 (1945); DeLeve, General Executions, in
MIssouRI CREDITORS' REMEDIES, § 2.5, 22 (Missouri Bar Association 1962).
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The reasons for permitting the execution to proceed are much more com-
pelling. The same reasons which support the modem rule of reversing only part
of the case on appeal also support the plaintiff. Plaintiff could have sued the inert
defendant alone, in which case he could not object on the basis of an appeal by
another tort-feasor in a separate case. Since the judgment is joint and several,
plaintiff should have the option of enforcing it against the defendant who has
failed to appeal. Plaintiff is entitled to make sure that the inert defendant does
not dispose of his assets before the case is finally settled. Since the inert defendant
did not pursue his remedy by appeal, he is in no position to argue that another
defendant's appeal should protect him. The absence of reported cases on this
point is some indication that the inert defendant's position on this point is regarded
as so weak that an appeal would be futile.54
IV. CoNcLusIoN
Both legislative and judicial policy support the avoidance of repeated trial
of issues which have been litigated.55 Since the inert defendant has had his day in
court and has not sought a new trial, his opponent should be entitled to hold to
his judgment against a defendant who does not appeal. While there can be no set
rule for every case, the inert defendant should not be given a new trial in the
absence of some special circumstances. The Missouri practice of reversal and
abeyance insures against multiple or different recoveries in the same case while
avoiding retrial of every issue. If a new trial is ordered on any issue in which
there was no finding of error, the reasons for the order should be clear. However,
some of the Missouri decisions since Hoelzel give little indication of the basis for
ordering a new trial on damages.5s
Cases of satisfaction of the judgment by an inert defendant are rare. The inert
defendant may satisfy the judgment voluntarily, but he will not always be able
to cut off the active defendant's right to appeal. Whatever right the inert defendant
may have to contribution under the first judgment may well -be cut off by a suc-
cessful appeal by his co-defendant. If he does not wish to satisfy the judgment
voluntarily, the inert defendant has little protection from execution while the
active defendant's appeal is pending. If the inert defendant's position is less secure
than that of his co-defendant, the resonsibility for his predicament is his own.
MANRDu R. JOHNSON
54. The leading case, and perhaps the only base is Nichols v. Dunphy, 58
Cal. 605 (1881). Nichwls v. Dunpy is discussed in Fowden v. Pacific Coast S.S.
Co., 149 Cal. 151, 86 Pac. 178 (1906), Grundel v. United Iron Works, 127
Cal. 438, 59 Pac. 826 (1900), and Robson v. Superior Court, supra note 48.
55. See § 512.160, RSMo 1959 supra note 32; Hoelzel v. Chicago, R.I. & P.
Ry., supra note 27; Annot. 34 A.L.R.2d 988 (1954); Annot. 143 A.L.R. 7 (1943).
56. See cases supra notes 33, 39.
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